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1 Introduction1
1.1 In Search of Behavioural Foundations
The question of how people actually behave in the economy is still an 
open one. Experimental economics has clearly shown that economic 
agents do not obey the (traditional) strong rational requirements we 
used to impose (See R. Selten: Presidential address of the 97’ Euro­
pean Economist Association Meeting). However, it is not necessarily 
preferable to assume that people are not rational. It might be better to 
assume that people are limited in their analytical capacity. This leads to 
the notion of “bounded rationality”. However, again it seems that people 
simply tend to escape a rigid definition of their behaviour. The definition 
of strong behavioural foundations appears to be, at least for the moment, 
impossible.
Though economic theory is not able to establish any foundation for the 
behaviour of the economic agents, it can provide useful criteria for clas­
sifying their different ways of behaving. Thus without going into the 
philosophical problem of the very motives for the (economic) behaviour 
of the agents, it is of interest to look at the type of behaviour that is 
likely to emerge in the economy.
Using an evolutionary “justification” , the prevalent opinion is that 
the only behaviour that may “survive” in the economy is profit-maximizing 
behaviour. The equivalent of this term for the consumer being (individ­
ual) utility maximization. As already mentioned, significant departures 
from such behaviour are observed. These can be interpreted as being the 
result of several factors:
First, they might be due to limited information or bias i.e. to a limited
'T his paper is a part of my Ph.D. Thesis. I would like to thank Louis Phlips for 
inviting me to present a previous version of this paper at his seminar. This chapter has 
also benefitted from helpful discussions at the 97’ Meeting of the Southern European 
Economic Theorist Association (ASSET) and at the departmental seminar o f the 
University o f Evry (France). I am indebted to David Cass, John Cubbin, Benedetto 
Gui, Alan Kirman, Stephen Martin, Marco Scarsini, Spyros Vassilakis and Bruno 
Versaevel for their useful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
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cognitive capacity of the agents. This is the notion of bounded rational­
ity, the question being then whether such a factor is likely to disappear 
in the long term or whether these limitations might be overcome by a 
learning process. In terms of behaviour, the question is: what type of 
behavioural types might be learned in the economy?
Second, there is a question about the nature of the welfare of the eco­
nomic agents. Some would consider it not unlikely that the agents are 
not indifferent to the situation of others, that managers behave to main­
tain their own standing with respect to others, etc. Such a question is of 
a more philosophical nature. Again, instead of taking a given position, 
it is of interest to know what type of behaviour is likely to emerge from 
interactions on the market.
The third factor that can be introduced to explain departures from com­
plete rationality has to do with the definition of rationality itself. The 
situation in which all agents do their best to maximize their own prof­
its is generally not the one that leads to the highest profits for all the 
(individual) agents. It might be true in a context where all economic 
agents were isolated. But whenever the agents effectively interact (even 
indirectly, by the mere fact of being part of the same economy) it is not 
the case. There is no reason why individual rationality should be able 
to coordinate to produce an outcome that is also rational for a group, 
because individual rationality looks exclusively at the consequences for 
itself. In the sense of S.-C. Kolm, this is already bounded rationality 
because agents do not look at all the consequences of their acts. The 
difference between individual rationality and group rationality is obvious 
when the prisoner’s dilemma is considered. However we may consider 
the possibility of situations that involve both the “level” of rationality 
and their viability.
Instead of assuming here a given (fixed) behaviour, whatever jus­
tification one mights have for it, we look at how people will select their 
behaviour from a set of different possible strategies. People are actually 
assumed to be perfectly rational in the sense that they behave according 
their objectives and the payoffs they would effectively get according to 
the strategy they adopt. In that sense, there is no such things as con­
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jectural variations. The agents find out what is their optimal behaviour 
within their economic environment. We do not assume information bias 
nor any limits to the cognitive capacity of the agents. W e may postu­
late instead perfect and complete information. This assumption does not 
claim to be realistic, but it emphasises the fact that the results are not 
due to imperfect information or to a flawed learning process.
Results will be interpreted according to the three perspectives mentioned 
above: capacity to discover the structure of the economic environment, 
emergence of a behavioural type (cultural convention), and, propensity of 
the market to coordinate to produce both individually-rational and group- 
rational outcomes.
1.2 The setting
To make the analysis precise, this chapter studies the emergence of en­
dogenous behavioural types in a rather specific framework, namely an 
oligopoly model a la Cournot. The reason why such a model was chosen 
is twofold: it is simple and it allows one to study interaction between 
agents in a well defined setting.
Several firms that produce a homogeneous good with an identical tech­
nology compete on the market. The production decisions are the result 
of a two-stage process. As no behaviour is assumed a priori for the 
firms, each economic agent selects one of the possible strategic profiles 
first and then decides on its production according to its (selected) be­
havioural type. Each firm attempts to maximize its profits and choose its 
behavioural type according to its profits in the existing economic envi­
ronment. For the sake of simplicity, only two behavioural types compete. 
One is the classic Cournot-Nash behaviour where the firm strategically 
takes into account the effect of their own production on the price. The 
other implies that the firm behaves more “passively” and sets the pro­
duction quantity by equating its marginal cost to prices. It corresponds 
to the price-taker behaviour in the general equilibrium model. An equi­
librium is achieved when the distribution of strategic profiles is such that 
no firm has any interest to modify its behavioural type.
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1.3 Interpretation and questions at hand
As already stated three interpretations can be given to the model, though 
they are clearly intrinsically connected.
The first perspective looks into the information problem. Though the 
computation of the Cournot strategy requires less information than in 
the joint-profit case, it still requires a knowledge of the slope of the de­
mand curve in addition to individual firms’ data. Accordingly, if this 
informational requisite is not claimed, the only justification for having 
firms that adopt a Cournot strategy is that this behavioural type hap­
pens to be more profitable for the firms that experiment it than an even 
simpler initial strategy. The strategy where firms set their quantities 
such that marginal costs equate with price would here serve as a basic 
initial strategy.
Note that the ability of firms to “learn” the Cournot equilibrium lim­
its the domain of application of the general equilibrium model where it 
is assumed that firms rather than having a strategic behaviour, simply 
adopt a passive maximization assuming that prices are fixed. Hence this 
model provides some hints on the choice of market description.
The other perspective attempts to explain the emergence of man­
agerial strategic types. Assume that firms are driven by managers. The 
manager’s payoff results from a contract signed with the firms’ owners, 
say once a year. The owners strive to maximize the firm’s profits by 
choosing the proper incentives among the possible contracts. Only two 
types of contracts are proposed here. The first one gives the manager a 
payoff proportional to the profit, hence having no distortion with respect 
to the final objectives of the firm’s owner. The other one gives a remu­
neration to the manager that takes account of both profits and sales, 
hence giving the firm a bias towards a more competitive behaviour than 
the standard Cournot-Nash.
It seems quite natural that even if there is no direct management and 
the firms’ owners appoint managers to run the firms, it should be in their 
own interest to make them maximize what is their own objective i. e. the 
profits of the firm. Hence one could erroneously conclude that whether 
the firm’s management is done by the owner of the firm or not has no
4
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effects on the firm’s strategy. In this view, whatever the structure of the 
firm, it is likely that firms end up reaching the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
However, the Cournot strategy rests on a conjecture that is wrong out of 
equilibrium, namely that the other firms have a fixed production level. 
Thus the Cournot-Nash strategy actually maximizes profits on condition 
that all the firms adopt the same strategy and produce at the Cournot- 
Nash level. If such a condition is not met, an alternative strategy might 
be more profitable.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is usually presented as the equilibrium 
concept that represents quantity-setting firms that “compete actively” 
in oligopoly. In the same way that the joint-profit, equilibrium is subject 
to cheating because some more competitive strategies are more profitable 
to individual firms, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not preserved from 
individual “deviations” . Thus if there is a possible commitment to some 
more competitive strategy, the latter is likely to emerge as a dominant 
strategy.
Technically, two questions arise. The first, that has already been pre­
sented, is the ability of firms to “learn” the Cournot Equilibrium i. e. the 
possibility of reaching the Cournot equilibrium, starting from a different 
strategic profile. The second is the stability of the Cournot equilibrium or 
the possibility that “active competition” brings firms to a less profitable 
equilibrium.
The third perspective looks at the coordination problem, as in R. 
Cooper’s and A. John’s 1988 paper. This problem arises at the level of 
the choice of strategic profiles. There is nevertheless a fundamental dif­
ference from the paper just mentioned. Given the strategic profiles, there 
is always one Nash equilibrium only in the game, in terms of quantity­
setting. There are (possibly) several Nash equilibria depending on the 
strategic profiles that predominate in the economy. In other words, this 
(originally) convex problem loses this fundamental property because of 
the sequentiality of the decision process. As a result coordination diffi­
culties arise in a setup that is expected to be structurally exempt from 
such problems.
The questions raised by these coordination failures are twofold. First, is
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it possible for the agents in the economy to even consider the possibility 
of an alternative (perfectly viable) state of the economy? Second, how 
may people coordinate to shift from one equilibrium to the other? The 
robustness of an equilibrium (its stability) would then be assessed by the 
threshold number of people necessary to make the shift to an alternative 
strategy attractive.
Finally, there is a question about the possibility of calibrating structural 
models if the very fact of allowing a sequential decision process may 
multiply the number of possible equilibria.
1.4 Structure of the paper
The present note is organised as follows. In section 2, a model is offered 
that examines the choice of strategic types in an oligopoly. It is assumed 
that in the first period, firms commit themselves to a given type and 
in the second period compete on the market according to this strategic 
type. In this context, various results are established.
First, depending upon both the market structure and the distribution of 
“types” , one “type” strictly dominates the other.
Second, Cournot equilibrium is only stable up to a threshold number of 
incumbents. This limits the domain of application of the Cournot model 
and defines when the competitive equilibrium model is to be used. 
Third, situations may arise where both the Cournot Equilibrium and the 
equilibrium that comes up when all firms “cheat” , are stable with respect 
to individual deviations of strategic type. This will cause a problem of 
equilibrium selection. Finally, while the stability of the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium increases with the convexity of the cost-function, it appears 
that both equilibria are stable when the cost function is linear. However, 
if any firm decides its output by equating the marginal cost with the 
price, then all firms will find it profitable to follow in its footsteps.
In section 3, an application follows in which numerical examples are 
given. The possibility of hysteresis is shown, reinforcing the idea that, in 
some cases, historical parameters matter. A  brief conclusion precedes a 
section that sums up the results in the form of tables and figures.
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2 The model
2.1 A  sequential decision process in a quantity set­
ting oligopoly
Assume, as in a simple Cournot oligopoly model, that N  firms produce 
an homogeneous good and face an inverse linear demand curve
P  (Q) =  A -  B Q , ( 1 )
where Q  is the total supply on the market. Firms are symmetric and use 
the same technology summarised for the sake of simplicity by a quadratic 
cost-function
C (q) =  a +  Pq +  'yq2, (2)
where a, (3, 7  >  0.
All firms are quantity setters that aim to maximise their profits 
given by the function
* (q ,Q )  =  P ( Q ) q -C ( q ) .  (3)
Assume two polar strategic types. The first one corresponds to 
the standard “Cournot strategy” . Each firm maximizes its own profits, 
given that rivals hold their quantities fixed. This type is labelled by a 
superscript. The other one corresponds to the “deviators”2 and describes 
a more competitive strategy. Firms ignore completely the price elasticity 
and set quantities by equating marginal costs with price just as in the 
competitive equilibrium model. This type is labelled by a subscript.
As explained above, the very fact that the Cournot strategy is not the 
optimal strategy in general provides a good justification for considering 
the possibility of alternative strategic types. Note that both strategic 
types that have been introduced here allow the firms to make positive
2In game theory literature, a ’'deviator' is a player who adopts a strategy that is 
more profitable for himself but that is less profitable if all players in the game were 
to adopt the same strategy. This explains why we attached such a name to the firms 
that adopt a type, strategic profile.
7
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
profits because the cost function is not assumed to be linear, but strictly 
convex.
The industry is characterized by a distribution (n ,n ) of strategic 
types among firms. It corresponds to the number n of firms that are 
“Cournot players” and the number n of “deviators” or “price takers” 3. 
This distribution is assumed to be exogenously given as the result of 
some historical process unknown to us. A  good argument for consider­
ing the possibility of having some “deviators” in the initial distribution 
is the fact that firms may not know the elasticity of the demand curve 
and therefore adopt in the first instance a more basic strategy, described 
here by type, that requires only the knowledge of price and of their own 
cost function. By allowing any distribution (n ,n ) at the initial stage of 
the game, various problems are contemplated; among others the stabil­
ity of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the ability for firms to “learn” 
Cournot strategy starting from a more elementary strategy.
It is assumed that firms have complete and perfect information and si­
multaneously and independently consider changes in their type (i.e. firms 
play a best-reply type conditioned by the actual distribution).
In order to study the endogenous choice of types, the profits asso­
ciated with each strategic type are now computed. Quantity decisions 
are obtained as a solution of the system of equations
P{Q) -
d C (q )
dq
=  o, (4)
ec(i)
= 0, (5)dq
3Throughout this chapter "deviators” might be referred to as "price-takers" in 
reference to the general equilibrium model. Type corresponds indeed to a quantity 
setting strategy that is optimum if prices are assumed to be fixed. In the general 
equilibrium model, this is the assumption that is made. The usual justification for 
this is that if the number of players is "big enough” their effect on the price tends to be 
negligible. However such a strategy can be interpreted as due to a lack of information 
on the market demand or instead as a strategic (more profitable) alternative to the 
standard Cournot-Nash strategy as revealed by the model. This strategy cannot be 
eliminated merely because the number o f players may be small.
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where Q  =  nq +  nq, (4) refers to type i.e. “Cournot players” and (5) 
refers to type i. e. “deviators” or “price-takers” . Quantity setting of type 
corresponds to a manager payoff proportional to the profits of the firm. 
Quantity setting of type corresponds to a payoff proportional to 7r +  Bq1. 
For the type distribution (n,n),  at equilibrium profits are
_  472 (7 +  B ) ( A -  PŸ
[472 +  27  (n 4- n +  1) B  +  n B 2] 
s =  7 (2q +  B )2 (A  — /?)2
[472 +  2q (n +  ri -t-1) B  +  n B 2]2
where N  =  n +  n.
2.2 First results and comparison with some other 
models in industrial economics
(6)
(7)
In all instances, 7r(n,n) >  K (n ,n ) holds. However, whether or not 
7T(n, n) >  7r (n — 1, n +  1) and tt (n, n) >  7f (n -I-1, n — 1) hold depends 
on the distribution of types among the firms. As a result, the attractive­
ness of a move from one type to the other is endogenous.
This situation is similar to that described byC. d’Aspremont, A . Jacquemin, 
J. J. Gabszewicz and J.A. Weymark (1983). They propose a model where 
the competitive fringe reaps higher profits than members of the cartel but 
firms can find it profitable to join the cartel since the resulting increase 
in price would raise a cartel member’s profit above what fringe firms cur­
rently receive. It is shown that with a fmite number of firms there is 
always a stable dominant cartel. In the following the “Cournot players” 
play the role of cartel members, and “deviators” that of the competitive 
fringe. Note however that the analogy stops there because the results 
fundamentally differ.
The inequality n (n, n) >  7f (n, n) means that a deviator always makes 
more profit than a Cournot player. If n (n,n)  >  7r(n — 1, n +  1) holds, 
it means that it is not profitable for a Cournot player to “cheat” and 
adopt the deviators’ strategic type. If 7r(n,n) >  7f ( n +  l ,n  — 1) holds, 
it means that it is not profitable for a deviator to adopt the Cournot
9
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strategic type. If both hold, neither Cournot players nor deviators have 
any interest in changing their strategic type. Hence the distribution of 
strategic types is in equilibrium. By contrast with the Cartel stability 
problem, it is shown that there is a threshold number of firms beyond 
which it is always more profitable for a firm to “cheat” rather than to 
adopt a Cournot strategic type. In other words, beyond a certain number 
of firms, the competitive equilibrium model is a correct representation 
of the market as type strictly dominates type. This result is similar to 
that of R. Selten in his paper “When four are few and six are many”. 
In his article it is shown that a cartel might be stable up to four firms 
on the market whereas joint-cooperation becomes impossible when there 
are more than five firms. In this case firms are assumed to adopt the 
Cournot strategies. The differences with R. Selten are to be found in the 
diverse behavioural types under scrutiny and in the more general setup 
that evidences the dependence of the threshold number over structural 
parameters.
2.3 W hen behavioural types are endogenous...
To study the stability of the Cournot strategic type, let the incremental 
profit that accrues to a single firm by shifting from type to type be =  
7r (n — 1, n +  1) — n (n, n) . It is the incremental profit that accrues to a 
Cournot player firm that joins the group of deviators. W e find
>  0 iff n >  f N Q 0  (8)
where f N (-g) =  ( l  +  2-g) ^4-*  ( l  +  -  2 (IV -  1) is the threshold
number of fir m s  beyond which all Cournot player firms find profitable 
to align on the corresponding type and join the deviators. For the incre­
mental profit 6iTf =  7f (n +  l ,n  — 1) -  2L (n ,n ) that accrues to a devia­
tor who joins the group of Cournot players, the following result holds: 
(57tt =  — [7r (n ,n ) — 7f (n +  l , n — 1)]. Hence
<$7rT >  0 iff n <  1 +  f N Q 0  . (9)
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The two inequalities make it possible to derive various results.
For an equilibrium in the types’ distribution to occur, the two condi­
tions 67Tj <  0 and <5tT[ <  0 have to be verified. This is clearly impossible. 
Hence, depending upon both the market structure and the distribution 
of types, one type strictly dominates the other. This result is in contrast 
with the cartel stability problem.
Three cases arise:
i. (n*,n*) =  (7V,0) iff f N ( i )  >  N  -  1. i.e. N  <  1 +  2 ^ ( l  +  %)
ii. Either (rT*,n*) =  (N ,0 ) or (n*,n*) =  (G,N)  iff 1 <  f N ) <  N  
hi. (n*, n*) =  (0,7V) iff f N ( § )  < 0  i.e. N  >  1 +  ( l  +  g )  ^  ( l  4- %)
In other words, in case (1), type is more profitable for all firms and 
“deviation” is never profitable. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the 
only stable equilibrium. Case (3) is symmetric: type is more profitable 
for all firms i.e. “deviation” is always profitable. The Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium is not stable as all firms prefer to behave as price-takers. In 
both cases there are no coordination problems. In the first case firms 
cannot fail to observe that the Cournot strategy is more profitable. This 
is due to the importance of demand elasticities. In the last case, even 
if all the firms perfectly well know that it would be more profitable for 
all firms to adopt type, the Cournot equilibrium is not stable when faced 
with the (more competitive) type.
In case (2), which type is adopted by all firms is indeterminate. Note 
that this indeterminacy is not due to imperfect or incomplete informa­
tion but to coordination aspects. The profitability of shifts in types is a 
function both of structural parameters -  such as brought in by the cost 
and demand specifications — and of the endogenous type distribution. 
Depending on the initial distribution of strategic types, the industry will 
end up either at the Cournot equilibrium or at the equilibrium where 
all firms adopt the deviators strategy. Both equilibria are stable against 
individual change of strategic type. In terms of information and learning,
11
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it means that firms are not able to “learn” the (more profitable) Cournot 
behavioural type if they all enter the market with an insufficient knowl­
edge for adopting a strategic profile different from type. Note that firms 
are not aware of the sub-optimality of their strategies. In terms of be­
havioural types, this means that the strategic profile that appears to be 
more profitable is not necessarily the Cournot one. In terms of coordina­
tion, a “group-deviation” is necessary in order for the economy to shift 
from one equilibrium to the other. In any case, for both an “internal” 
or an hypothetical “external” observer, it is a rather arbitrary choice to 
decide which behavioural types correspond to the equilibrium values. It 
will depend on some exogenous factors that are not introduced in the 
model, such as the “history” of the industry. This question is addressed 
below by means of a numerical illustration.
Finally, note that case (1) becomes more likely when 7 /B  increases 
whereas case (2) is almost certain when 7 /B  goes to zero. When costs 
are linear the Cournot equilibrium is “metastable” . No firms find it 
profitable to “deviate” . However, if one does, all firms will shift to the 
more competitive strategic profile. This possibility of both behavioural 
types is what makes the difference from the work of P. D. Klemperer and 
M. A. Meyer (1986, 1989).
To sum up, the results are :
i. In contrast to the stability of cartels, either all firms will adopt 
Cournot strategies or all firms will prefer to “deviate” i.e. to behave 
as price-takers. In terms of incentives, this means that, for the 
managers, only one type of contract will prevail.
See Figures 3,4 and 5.
ii. Cournot equilibrium is only stable up to a threshold number of 
incumbents.
If the number of firms is high enough, all firms prefer to “cheat” . 
This defines the domains of validity of both market representations: 
The Cournot model and the competitive equilibrium model.
See Figures 1,2 and 5.
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iii. Both Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium that arises 
when all firms prefer to deviate may be stable to an individual 
change of strategy with unchanged structural parameters. Hence 
there is a problem of equilibrium selection. The choice of the right 
strategy profile becomes a coordination game.
Note in particular that if the industry starts up with the basic 
strategy referred as type , it is unlikely that it will “learn” the more 
sophisticated (and more profitable) type.
Example: 7 / B  =  0.8 and N  =  4. See Figure 1 and 2.
iv. The more convex the cost-function, the lower the incentive to “de­
viate” from Cournot Equilibrium.
The higher the number of firms, the higher the incentive to deviate. 
When costs are linear both equilibria are stable for any N  and if 
any firm adopts type, then all firms will find profitable to follow 
suit.
See Figure 5.
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3 An example
Assume that N  =  n +  n =  5 firms produce a homogeneous good and 
face an inverse linear demand-curve P  — A  — B Q , where A  =  150 and 
B  =  2.5. Firms are symmetric and use the same technology summarised 
by the quadratic cost-function C  (q) =  75 +  6q +  3q2. Individual profits 
for all possible distributions of types are given in Table 1. They were 
obtained from the expressions derived in (6) and (7) above.
Table 1: Cournot versus Price-Taker Strategy
Table 1 Number of firms adopting type
individual profits
r—iIIISoIIIS n =  2 n =  3 71 =  4 n =  5
7T 105.1 121.0 139.0 159.7 183.6
1L 106.8 121.1 139.5 159.3 182.0
The decision in choosing the strategic type is made by comparing n (n) and 
7T (n -f 1). In order to facilitate the reading of the tables, the highest value is 
printed in bold characters.
Consider for example the distribution (n ,n ) =  (1 ,4 ). Since 7T (0 , 5 ) >7T (1,4) , 
individual rationality implies that the f irm  sliifts to type to yield (n*,H*) 
=; (0 ,5) . Symmetrically, for (n ,n ) =  (4 ,1) , we have 7T (4 ,1) <  n (5,0). This in 
turn implies that the f irm  shifts to type to give (n * ,»* )  =  (5 ,0 ). Both distri­
butions (5 ,0) and (0 ,5) constitute stable equilibria.
In this example, both distributions (5 ,0) and (0 ,5 ) constitute sta­
ble equilibria. Which type is adopted by all firms may be described as 
resulting from a shock to demand that occurred in a previous period. 
This motivates the examination of the two following cases.
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Case 1: Let P  =  A  — (£-1-1.5) Q, ceteris paribus. Individual profits 
are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Negative Shock to Demand
Table 2 Number o f firms adopting type
individual profits n =  0 n =  1 n — 2 n =  3 n =  4 rt =  5 
if 12.8 25.5 41.3 61.0 86.3
_______ £___________17.0 29.5 44.7 63.4 86.9_________
Since 7r (n ,n ) < tt(n — l ,n  -r 1), we have (n*,n*) =  (0 ,5 ). All firms adopt type.
A  shock to the slope of the (inverse) demand curve may lead to P  =  
A  — B Q , that is to the set of individual profits described in Table 1. Since 
tF (1 ,4) <  7T (0 ,5 ) , individual rationality implies that no fir m  shifts. 
Accordingly, (n*,n*) =  (0 ,5) is a stable equilibrium. Since 7f (5 ,0) <  
7T (4 ,1 ) , 7 f(4 ,l)  <  7T (3 ,2 ) , if (3 ,2) <  7t (2 ,3) , 7f (2 ,3) <  7r (1 ,4 ) , and 
as already stated 7 f(l,4 ) <  tr (0 ,5 ) , there is a “cascade” of deviations. 
All firms cheat, i.e. adopt type and (n*,ri*) =  (0 ,5) is the only stable 
distribution of strategic type.
Case 2: Let P  =  A  — ( £ —1.5) Q , ceteris paribus. Individual profits 
are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Positive Shock to Demand
Table 3 Number of firms adopting type
individual profits al II o 31 II n =  2 n =  3 n — 4 n — 5
7T 442.0 455.8 470.3 485.33 501.0
7T 439.1 452.7 466.9 481.6 497.0
Since 7T (71, ti) < tt (n -  l ,n  — 1), we have (n*,n*) =  (5 ,0 ). All firms adopt type.
Symmetrically, if a shock results in P  =  A  -  B Q , giving the set 
of individual profits described in Table 1. then tt (4 ,1) <  W (5 ,0) implies 
that no firm  shifts. Accordingly, (n*,n*) =  (5 ,0) is a stable equilibrium. 
In the same manner as above, it is possible to show that all firms will
15
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prefer type. The distribution (n*,n*) =  (5 ,0) i.e. Cournot equilibrium is 
the only stable equilibrium.
The main result is that a distribution of strategic types should not 
be considered as determined by market structure parameters only. It was 
shown that two distinct distributions of types may arise in unchanged de­
mand and technological conditions. Moreover, assume that the distribu­
tion of types is (say) (n, n) =  (0, T V ) . Because 7f (TV, 0) >  £  (0, TV) always 
holds, group rationality implies that all firms should adopt type. When 
at the same time 7r(0, TV) >  W ( 1 ,N  — 1 ), individual rationality implies 
that all firms remain stuck with type. Furthermore, if (1, — 1) >
If (2, TV — 2) a single move is not sufficient to align individual rationality 
with group rationality, that is to make a shift to type profitable for the 
other firms. Hysteresis arises unless a threshold value nc €  [1, TV — 1] ex­
ists beyond which each firm in isolation finds it individually rational to 
shift. In other words if a distribution happens to be robust to individual 
moves, then coordination is necessary for all firms in the industry to shift 
to a more profitable behavioural type.
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4 Conclusion
Such a simple model that offers only two strategic types does not pre­
tend to reflect reality. However it helps to underline that Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium is to be considered as a convention rather than as the pre­
cise outcome of “active competition” in oligopolies. A  frontier is drawn 
between the domain of application of the Cournot-model (or strategic 
models) and that of the competitive equilibrium model.
The possibility of having two stable equilibria in some cases suggests that 
coordination problems might arise in the market. Such a conjecture is 
to be considered with precaution as it may result from the discrete set 
of strategic types presented. However it seriously questions the ability 
of market competition as a selection mechanism and thus as a factor of 
welfare, however it might be defined. Of importance is the fact that the 
problem under scrutiny was structurally convex. This property is lost 
because the decision process is assumed to be sequential. Such a result 
suggests that coordination problems might be more common than one 
might think at first sight.
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6 Tables and Figures
Table B l : P  =  1 5 0 - 2.5Q C  (< )) =  6? +  0.03<)J
Number of Number of Payoff o f a Payoff o f a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’csII* 2  =  0 917.91 _
n =  1 4.20 90.72
n =  2 - 24.30
N  =  3 n =  0 518.38 _
n  =  1 4.02 86.79
n =  2 1.10 23.74
a  =  3 _ 10.88
N  =  4 n =  0 332.56 _
n — 1 3.85 83.12
n =  2 1.08 23.21
n =  3 0.50 10.72
n =  4 _ 6.15
N =  5 n =  0 231.31 _
n =  1 3.69 79.67
n =  2 1.05 22.69
n — 3 0.49 10.55
n =  4 0.28 6.08
n =  5 - 3.94
N =  6 n =  0 170.14 _
n =  1 3.54 76.43
n =  2 1.03 22.19
n =  3 0.48 10.40
n =  4 0.28 6.01
n =  5 0.18 3.91
n =  6 - 2.74
N  — 7 n =  0 130.37 _
n =  1 3.40 73.38
n =  1 1.01 21.71
n =  1 0.47 10.24
n =  1 0.28 5.94
n =  1 0.18 3.87
n =  1 0.13 2.72
a  =  7 - 2.02
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Table B l : P  =  150 - •2.5Q C  (?) =  6<( l 0 .039 ?
Number of Number of Payoff o f a Payoff of a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’
N  =  8 n =  0 103.08 _
n =  1 3.27 70.52
n =  2 0.98 21.24
n =  3 0.47 10.09
n =  4 0.27 5.87
n =  5 0.18 3.84
n =  6 0.13 2.70
n =  7 0.09 2.00
71 — 8 _ 1.55
N  =  9 n =  0 83.53 _
n =  1 3.14 67.81
n =  2 0.96 20.79
n =  3 0.46 9.94
n =  4 0.27 5.80
n =  5 0.18 3.80
n =  6 0.12 2.68
n =  7 0.09 1.99
n =  8 0.07 1.54
n =  9 _ 1.22
N  =  10 n =  0 69.07 _
n =  1 3.02 65.26
n =  2 0.94 20.35
n =  3 0.45 9.79
71 — 4 0.27 5.74
n =  5 0.17 3.77
n =  6 0.12 2.66
71 =  7 0.09 1.98
n — 8 0.07 1.53
n =  9 0.06 1.22
71— 10 - 0.99
Table 4: Strategic Equilibria and Payoffs for Quasi-Linear Cost Functions
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Table B2 : P =  1 5 0 - 2.5Q C ( 9) =  7.5 4 -  69 -  0.3|J2
Number of Number of Payoff of a Payoff of a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’
N  =  2 n =  0 877.44 _
n =  1 161.84 476.83
n =  2 _ 190.87
N  =  3 n =  0 509.24 _
n =  1 123.95 368.46
n =  2 51.26 160.57
n — 3 _ 87.31
N  =  4 n =  0 330.83 -
n =  1 97.49 292.77
n =  2 42.92 136.72
n =  3 22.02 76.93
n =  4 _ 47.86
N  =  5 n =  0 231.08 -
n =  1 78.28 237.84
n =  2 36.24 117.60
n =  3 18.95 68.16
n =  4 10.20 43.14
n =  5 _ 28.75
TV =  6 n =  0 169.73 _
n =  1 63.90 196.71
n — 2 30.80 102.05
n =  3 16.34 60.69
n =  4 8.75 38.99
n =  5 4.29 26.21
n =  6 _ 18.06
N  =  7 n =  0 129.32 _
n =  1 52.85 165.11
n =  2 26.32 89.23
n =  3 14.10 54.27
n =  4 7.48 35.33
n =  5 3.49 23.93
n =  6 0.91 16.55
n =  7 - 11.49
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Table B 2 : P  = 1 5 0 - 2.5C? C(<j) =  7.5 4- 6q -t- 0.3<72
Number of Number of Payoff o f a Payoff o f a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’
II 00 n =  0 101.31 -
n =  1 44.18 140.32
n =  2 22.58 78.54
n =  3 12.16 48.72
n =  4 6.34 32.09
n =  5 2.77 21.88
n =  6 0.42 15.16
a  =  7 -1 .20 10.51
n =  8 _ 7.16
N =  9 n =  0 81.09 _
n =  1 37.26 120.51
n =  2 19.43 69.52
n =  3 10.46 43.88
n =  4 5.33 29.20
n =  5 2.12 20.02
n =  6 -0 .02 13.90
n =  7 -1 .52 9.61
n =  8 -2.61 6.49
n — 9 _ 4.16
oII£ n =  0 66.03 _
n =  1 31.64 104.44
n =  2 16.75 61.85
n =  3 8.98 39.64
n =  4 4.43 26  62
71 =  5 1.53 18.33
71 =  6 -0 .43 12.73
n =  7 -1.81 8.77
n =  8 -2 .82 5.87
n =  9 -3 .59 3.68
n =  10 - 1.99
Table 5: Strategic Equilibria and Payoffs for “low” Decreasing-Returns-
to-Scale
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Table B3 : P =  1 5 0 - 2.5Q C (? )  =  75 *  6<j -  3<7 v
Number of Number of Payoff of a Payoff of a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’
N  =  2 n =  0 550.78 _
n =  1 464.34 515.41
n =  2 _ 439.12
JV =  3 n =  0 370.50 _
n =  1 317.70 354.89
n =  2 273.76 306.79
n =  3 _ 266.33
N  =  4 n =  0 258.23 _
n =  1 223.65 251.93
n =  2 194.19 219.68
n =  3 168.88 191.97
n =  4 _ 168.00
W =  5 n =  0 183.61 _
n =  1 159.75 181.98
n =  2 139.06 159.31
n =  3 120.95 139.51
n =  4 105.07 122.12
n =  5 _ 106.76
N  =  6 n =  0 131.52 _
n =  1 114.36 132.29
n =  2 99.25 115.75
n =  3 85.88 101.12
n =  4 74.00 88.11
n =  5 63.38 76.48
n =  6 _ 66.06
N =  7 n =  0 97.71 _
n =  1 80.96 95.73
n =  2 69.61 83.30
n =  3 59.45 72.18
n =  4 50.32 62.19
n =  5 42.10 53.19
n =  6 34.65 45.04
n =  7 - 37.64
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Table B3: P =  1 5 0 - 2.5Q C (< i)= 7 5 4- 6<7 4- 3<72
Number of Number of Payoff of a Payoff of a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’
N =  8 n =  0 65.41 _
n =  1 55.68 68.06
n =  2 46.93 58.48
n =  3 39.03 49.83
n =  4 31.88 42.00
n =  5 25.37 34.88
n =  6 19.44 28.39
n =  7 14.03 22.46
n =  8 - 17.03
N =  9 IS II o 43.68 _
n =  1 36.09 46.60
n =  2 29.20 39.07
n =  3 22.94 32.21
n =  4 17.22 25.95
n =  o 11.99 20.23
n =  6 7.19 14.98
n =  7 2.78 10.15
n =  8 -1 .28 5.70
n =  9 _ 1.59
oil n =  0 26.62 _
n =  1 20.59 29.64
n =  2 15.07 23.60
n =  3 10.02 18.07
n =  4 5.38 13.00
n =  5 1.11 8.32
71 — 6 -2 .82 4.01
n =  7 -6 .46 0.03
71 =  8 -9 .83 -3 .6 6
7» =  9 -12.96 -7 .0 8
n =  10 - -1 0 .2 7
Table 6: Strategic Equilibria and Payoffs for “medium” Decreasing-
Returns-to-Scale
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Table B4 : P  =  150 - 2.5Q C(<,) =  25 +  99'2
Number of Number of Payoff of a Payoff of a
Firms ‘deviators’ Cournot player ‘deviator’
II n =  0 372.92 _
n =  1 362.30 368.15
n =  2 _ 357.80
N =  3 n =  0 305.04 _
n =  1 297.00 301.86
n =  2 289.26 294.00
n =  3 _ 286.42
TV =  4 n =  0 253.15 _
n =  1 246.92 251.03
n =  2 240.90 244.92
n =  3 235.08 239.01
n =  4 _ 233.29
TV =  5 n =  0 212.60 _
n =  1 207.68 211.19
n =  2 207.91 206.35
n =  3 198.28 201.65
n =  4 193.80 197.10
n =  5 _ 192.68
TV =  6 n =  0 180.32 _
n =  1 176.36 179.40
n =  2 172.51 175.50
n =  3 168.78 171.70
n =  4 165.15 168.02
n =  5 161.62 164.43
n =  6 - 160.95
TV =  7 n =  0 154.19 _
n =  1 150.96 153.62
n =  2 147.82 150.42
n =  3 144.75 147.32
n =  4 141.78 144.29
n =  5 138.87 141.35
n =  6 136.05 138.48
n =  7 - 135.68
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Table B4 : P  =  150 - 2.5Q C (<j) — 25 -  V
Number of Number of Payoff of a Payoff of a
Firms ’deviators* Cournot player ’deviator’
N  =  8 n =  0 132.75 _
n =  1 130.08 132.42
n =  2 127.48 129.78
n =  3 124.94 127.20
n — 4 122.46 124.69
n =  5 120.05 122.24
n =  6 117.69 119.85
n =  7 115.39 117.51
n =  8 _ 115.24
N =  9 n =  0 114.94 _
n =  1 112.71 114.79
n =  2 110.53 112.57
n — 3 108.40 110.41
n =  4 106.32 108.30
n =  5 104.29 106.24
n — 6 102.31 104.23
n =  7 100.37 102.26
n =  8 98.47 100.34
n =  9 _ 98.46
N  — 10 n =  0 90.98 _
n =  1 98.10 99.96
n =  2 96.26 98.09
n =  3 94.45 96.26
n =  4 92.69 94.47
71 =  5 90.97 92.72
n =  6 89.28 91.01
71 =  7 87.63 89.33
n =  8 86.02 87.69
n =  9 84.44 86.09oII~l - 84.52
Table 7: Strategic Equilibria and Payoffs for “High” Decreasing-Returns-
to-Scale
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Figure 1: Minimum Number of Cournot Players to Ensure the Stability 
of Cournot Equilibrium
Figure 2: Threshold Proportion of Cournot Players to Ensure the Sta­
bility of Cournot Equilibrium
type is dominant when the number of firms that adopt this strategic type is 
higher than the minimum given by the curve relating to the corresponding total 
number o f firms in the industry N . (Plot o f the point (7 /B ,n )  is to the right and 
above the curve). Consider for example the particular value -g =  0.8. If N =  2 or 
N =  3, all firms adopt type. If N =  4, all firms find it profitable to shift to type when 
n <  2 and all firms adopt type when n >  2. If N >  5 all firms adopt type.
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at
Figure 3: Map of the Stability Regions (7 / B  =  2)
In both regions o f the plan ( n ,n )  firms find it profitable to align on the 
corresponding type (i.e. type where Cournot equilibrium is stable, type in the other). 
At the frontier between both regions, there is high instability because it is profitable 
for both groups to shift to the other strategic type.
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Figure 4: Metastability of the Cournot Equilibrium for Quasi-Linear Cost 
Functions
In both regions o f the plan (n, n)  firms find it profitable to align on the 
corresponding type (i.e. type where Cournot equilibrium is stable, type in the other). 
When the frontier passes through the lines n  +  n  =  N ,  it means that for the number 
of firms, both equilibria are possible. This is especially likely when the cost functions 
are only slightly convex. (See the frontier for 7 /B — 0 .1).
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10r  
9 -
2 • 
1
Cournot equilibrium strictly dominates
0 1---------------------- '---------------------1----------------------- >—
0 0.5  1 1.5
Gamma/B
Figure 5: Number of Firms, Convexity of the Cost Functions and Stabil­
ity of the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium.
In both regions firms find it profitable to align on the corresponding type (i.e. 
type where Cournot equilibrium is stable, type in the other). In between the two lines 
both equilibria are possible, which is always the case when the cost function is linear. 
For any strictly convex technology, there is a threshold number of firms that makes 
the Cournot equilibrium unstable.
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